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This thesis proposes a novel defective T analysis for explaining two facts about Icelandic
quirky subject sentences. First, in Icelandic quirky subject sentences, the verb agrees with the
nominative object rather than with the subject (1). Second, 1st and 2nd person nominative














‘She found us boring.’
Based in a Minimalist Program framework, I argue that T in quirky subject sentences is
ϕ-defective, lacking [Person]. I also describe three potential alternative Minimalist analyses
of Icelandic: (i) a ϕ-stacking analysis based on Richards’ case-stacking; (ii) a complex
dependency analysis from López; and (iii) a split ϕ probe analysis supported by Sigurðsson
and Holmberg. All of these alternatives come with additional theoretical baggage that makes
them suboptimal for explaining the quirky Icelandic facts. I also show how previous analyses
of Icelandic all fail to adequately explain the data.
In my novel defective T analysis, T in quirky subject sentences lacks [Person]. In quirky
subject sentences, first T probes its ϕ-features. The quirky subject is inaccessible due to the
Activity Condition, so the ϕ probe finds the nominative object. If the nominative object is
3rd person, T and the DP will be relatively ϕ-complete, and the derivation converges. If the
nominative object is 1st or 2nd person, they are not relatively ϕ-complete, and the derivation
crashes. While T being ϕ-defective in quirky subject sentences may seem stipulative, this
could be explained by looking at the nature of quirky verbs in Icelandic, as well as the
relation between the lexical verb and tense. In this thesis, I show that this defective T
analysis is the best analysis for explaining the Icelandic quirky subject agreement patterns
and restrictions and show how other Minimalist and pre-Minimalist analyses fall short.
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1.1 Case and Icelandic Quirky Case
Case is often classified as structural (determined by a particular structural configuration)
or lexical (determined by the verb). Lexical case can be further divided into predictable
thematic case and unpredictable idiosyncratic case. Thematic case, such as dative on Expe-
riencers, is relatively common. It is found in languages such as Spanish, Russian, and English.
Idiosyncratic lexical case is not predictable based on thematic roles, and is much less common
crosslinguistically. Idiosyncratic lexical case is also sometimes called quirky case. Icelandic
and Faroese (both Insular Scandinavian languages) exhibit quirky case phenomena. In a
nominative-accusative language like Icelandic, subjects usually take nominative and direct
objects usually take accusative. In these constructions, such as in 1, the finite verb always







‘Someone bought the books.’
Icelandic also has quirky case, which allows for other case and agreement configurations.
Quirky case is often generalized as nonnominative markings on subjects and nonaccusative
markings on direct objects (Schütze 1993). A more complete and accurate description would
be idiosyncratic lexical case marking, as described above (Thráinsson 2007). The following
examples show why this is so. In 2, dative case on the subject is quirky. In 3, both accusative










‘I like these cars.’
















Schütze 1993: ex 33d, p 352
In 2, the nominative object is not considered quirky; it receives structural nominative
case. In 3, the accusative object is quirky, despite accusative case on objects being standard
in nominative-accusative constructions. This can be tested because quirky elements maintain
their quirky case under passivization. Even though it is an accusative object, it stays
accusative when passivized. This contrasts with nonquirky accusative objects which become
nominative. These examples justify the use of Thráinsson’s quirky description over Schütze’s,
which over- and undergenerates quirky examples. Schütze’s framework would consider the
nominative object in 2 quirky and the accusative object in 3 nonquirky. Thráinsson’s frame-
work does not encounter these miscategorizations.
In Icelandic quirky subject sentences, the finite verb does not agree with the quirky








‘She found the boys boring.’
Sigurðsson 1993: ex 3, p 1
Another empirical fact about Icelandic quirky subject constructions is that they prohibit
1st and 2nd person nominative objects. No pattern of agreement, whether subject- object-,
or default-agreement, allows a 1st or 2nd person nominative object in these constructions.








‘She found us boring.’
Sigurðsson 1996: ex 56, p 24
3Although the verb appears to agree with the nominative object in examples like 5,
agreement—at least for number—is optional in some configurations. Icelandic is a V2 lan-
guage, and the subject or object can move to the clause-initial position (Thráinsson 2007).
Number agreement is optional when the quirky subject is topicalized, as in 7, but not when
the nominative object is topicalized, as in 8. This asymmetry does not exist for nonquirky
sentences, as I demonstrate in 9–10, where number agreement is obligatory.


















‘I like these cars.’
Schütze 1993: ex 32, p 351


















‘I like these cars.’














‘Someone bought the books.’














‘Someone bought the books.’
4These three phenomena (object agreement, the 1st/2nd person nominative object re-
striction, and the number agreement asymmetry) all need to be explainable in a syntactic
analysis of Icelandic. In this thesis, I focus primarily on the issues of object agreement and
the 1st/2nd person object restriction. I ignore the issue of the number agreement asymmetry
for now, but in future work, I hope to include it in a unified account of the Icelandic quirky
case and agreement facts.
1.2 Research Questions
The research questions I investigate in this thesis address the issues of object agreement
and the 1st/2nd person nominative object restriction in Icelandic quirky subject construc-
tions: (i) Why does the finite verb show overt agreement with the nominative object rather
than with the quirky subject?; (ii) Why are 1st and 2nd person nominative objects blocked
in quirky subject constructions?
1.3 Thesis Roadmap
In this chapter, I provided a general description of Icelandic quirky case. I provided
representative examples to illustrate the main phenomena in which I am interested, as well
as the two research questions that I investigate in this thesis.
In Chapter 2, I will describe my theoretical framework, which is based in the Minimalist
program. I will detail the necessary theoretical components that I adopt, as well as the
remaining assumptions needed for my analyses.
In Chapter 3, I will review three early Minimalist analyses of the Icelandic quirky case
data. I briefly discuss how these analyses attempted to explain the Icelandic data, as well
as point out their theoretical shortcomings.
In Chapter 4, I will provide the details of the four main Minimalist analyses that
I consider to answer my two research questions. I will start by describing a ϕ-stacking
approach, based on Richards (2013). Next I will discuss López’s (2008) complex dependency
analysis. I then consider an analysis which splits [Person] into a separate probe, with
independent support from an analysis by Sigurðsson and Holmberg (2008). Finally, I describe
my defective T analysis, where T lacks a [Person] feature in quirky subject sentences. This
defective T analysis is what I ultimately adopt to explain the Icelandic data.
In Chapter 5, I will provide a summary of the relevant Icelandic data, my theoretical





The theoretical framework that I adopt as the basis for my analyses of the Icelandic
quirky subject data is the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995, 2000, 2001, 2004). From the
Minimalist Program, I adopt the operation Agree, the use of probe-goal agreement, the
Activity Condition on feature checking, and relative ϕ-completeness as a requirement
for feature checking. Outside of the core of Minimalism, I adopt a few other assumptions.
Most importantly, I adopt that only 1st and 2nd person DPs are [+Person], and also that
T can be ϕ-defective. These assumptions and how they manifest combine in a way that can
adequately explain the Icelandic quirky subject data.
While this chapter describes the general theoretical framework I adopt, there are some
analysis-specific assumptions. I discuss these in their respective sections. Furthermore, this
theoretical framework does not necessarily apply to analyses which I did not create myself.
For example, the complex dependency analysis from López (2008) makes use of different
assumptions, and a modified split ϕ probe analysis from Sigurðsson and Holmberg (2008)
uses a slightly different system than my split ϕ analysis. These differences are detailed in
the descriptions of the relevant analyses.
2.2 The Minimalist Program
The main goal of the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995, 2000, 2001, 2004) is to
eliminate anything from our theory of syntax that is not explicitly required at our lan-
guage interfaces (Articulatory-Perceptual and Conceptual-Intentional). This is referred to
as the Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT). This theoretical framework eliminates many
theoretically unnecessary components, such as the distinction between deep structure and
surface structure, spec-head agreement configurations, and covert movement.
The core Minimalist components that I adopt for my analyses are Agree (Chomsky
2001), the use of the Activity Condition in feature checking (Chomsky 2001; Hornstein et
6al. 2005), a probe-goal system of agreement (Chomsky 2001), and relative ϕ-completeness
as a requirement for feature checking (Chomsky 2001).
2.2.1 Agree
In the Minimalist system of feature checking that I adopt, only interpretable features are
specified in the lexicon (Chomsky 2001; Hornstein et al. 2005). Uninterpretable features must
acquire their values during the derivation. As Hornstein et al. describe, [Person] on a DP is
lexically assigned a value, but [Person] on T or on a verb has no lexically specified value. In
order to satisfy Full Sharing (López 2008), which states that uninterpretable features must
be deleted from the derivation, I adopt the operation Agree (Chomsky 2001). Agree assigns
values to unvalued features and simultaneously deletes uninterpretable features from the
derivation for logical form (LF) purposes.
2.2.2 Probe-Goal Agreement
The operation Agree operates in the form of a probe-goal relation (Chomsky 2001). A
probe is a head with uninterpretable features, while a goal is an element with a matching
interpretable feature. A probe will search its c-command domain for a suitable goal. In
order to find a goal, however, there are some restrictions. First, there must not be any active
intervening element that also has the relevant set of features; otherwise, the probe will find
that element as its goal. Second, the goal must be active for purposes of Agree, which I will
describe in the following section.
2.2.3 Activity Condition
The Activity Condition on feature checking (Chomsky 2001; Hornstein et al. 2005)
requires an element to be active in order to be found as a goal by a probe. That is, they need
to have some unchecked/unvalued feature. A subject’s unvalued Case feature keeps it active
in standard nominative-accusative sentences, so it can be found as a goal by T’s ϕ-feature
probe.
2.2.4 Relative ϕ Completeness
I also adopt the necessity of relative ϕ-completeness in feature checking (Chomsky 2001).
If T and a DP are not relatively ϕ-complete, they cannot establish a checking relation, and
the derivation will crash. This is essentially the same as nonfinite T being ϕ-defective and
failing to license nominative on subjects.
For my purposes, the requirement for relative ϕ-completeness only relates to the set
7of ϕ-features on the DP. If all of the ϕ-features on a DP have a correlate on T, they are
relatively ϕ-complete, even if T has additional ϕ-features. Thus, a 3rd person subject with
a ϕ-complete T will not lead to a crash. The reverse of this is not true. If the DP has extra
ϕ-features that T does not have, they will not be relatively ϕ-complete, and the derivation
will crash. This definition of relative ϕ-completeness will allow me to explain both quirky
and nonquirky data.
In some of the examples that I present, T will end up with an unvalued [Person] feature,
due to the DP being 3rd person. Since ϕ-features are uninterpretable on T by assumption,
this may raise some questions. This will not necessarily lead to a crash. Other sentence types
suggest that T’s ϕ-features may be able to acquire default values later in the derivation (or
even postsyntactically) (Corbett 2006). For example, consider CP subjects (11) and infinitive
phrase subjects (12).
(11) [That he came so early] was very surprising.
Corbett 2006: ex 4, p 37
(12) [To err] is human.
Corbett 2006: ex 5, p 37
These types of agreement controllers are not traditionally thought of as possessing ϕ-
features. Despite this, CPs and infinitive phrases can be subjects, and when they are they
induce what appears to be 3rd person singular agreement on the verb. In these sorts of
examples, T’s ϕ-features are still uninterpretable, so they must get values somewhere. It
might be argued that T obtains default values for any unvalued ϕ-features left over at some
point in the derivation. This notion will recur throughout Chapter 4, and plays a large role
in the defective T analysis that I adopt for the Icelandic data.
2.3 [±Person] DPs
Based on the observed agreement facts, we see an asymmetry between 1st/2nd person and
3rd person, with 3rd person behaving as an outlier. To address this, I follow Boeckx (2000)
and Sigurðsson (1996) in adopting the notion that only 1st/2nd person is truly [+Person].
In these analyses, 3rd person DPs lack a [Person] feature entirely. DPs lacking [Person] is
not completely novel. Further support for this notion comes from discussion of pronouns
and R-expressions, which are often argued to lack ϕ-features.
Preminger (2014) provides additional support for 3rd person NPs or DPs lacking [Per-
son]. Preminger describes an expanded ϕ-feature geometry, where a root may have further
8specifications beyond simply [Person] and [Number]. I show Preminger’s expanded ϕ-feature
geometry in 13.







Preminger’s argument for his analysis of Sakha treats 3rd person NPs as “not quite
empty,” instead possessing the root [ϕ] and maybe the “metanodes” [Person] and [Number],
but lacking [plural], [participant], and [author]. While Preminger focuses on Sakha, this
analysis provides additional external evidence for 3rd person NPs or DPs lacking [Person],
a necessary assumption for the analysis of Icelandic that I adopt in this thesis.
2.4 Defective T
T can be ϕ-defective; that is, T can lack certain ϕ-features. This is often seen in nonfinite
clauses, where a defective T is said to license/assign null case on PRO (Hornstein et al. 2005).
Corbett (2006) provides another description of defectiveness. Corbett says that “defectiveness
depends on a notion of what can be reasonably expected.” For example, Corbett notes that
impersonal verbs are not expected to have a 1st person singular form. Because of support
from ϕ-defective T existing in other arenas, I adopt the possibility of T being ϕ-defective in
Icelandic quirky subject sentences. This theoretical component will only play a role in the
defective T analysis that I adopt.
CHAPTER 3
PREVIOUS ANALYSES OF ICELANDIC
In this chapter, I will briefly overview a few previous analyses of the Icelandic quirky case
data. I look at two early Minimalist analysis of Icelandic by Schütze (1993) and Sigurðsson
(1996), along with an analysis by Boeckx (2000) that is based in Distributed Morphology.
3.1 Schütze (1993)
Schütze (1993) provides a relatively early Minimalist analysis of Icelandic quirky case and
licensing. The analysis attemptes to account for the data using the Minimalist Program, but
the version of Minimalism that Schütze uses relied on now-rejected theoretical components.
Specifically, Schütze’s system relies on AgrXPs and abstract subject and object licensing
features [Li], which are not adopted in a more recent, stronger Minimalist framework, such
as the one I adopt from Chapter 2.
3.1.1 AgrXPs, Case, and Licensing
In Schütze’s system, AgrS checks nominative case, T checks the abstract subject licensing
feature, and AgrO checks both accusative case and the abstract object licensing feature.
Schütze’s separation of case from licensing features is twofold. First, it is to distinguish
subjects from nominative case elements. Subjects can bear cases other than nominative,
and nonsubjects can bear nominative case. Second, this separation is to distinguish objects
from accusative case elements. Objects can bear cases other than accusative, and nonobjects
can sometimes bear accusative case.
In order to achieve the observed patterns for Icelandic, Schütze rearranges the order of
AgrS, T, and AgrO in the tree. In the contemporary standard Minimalist Program, AgrSP
is higher in the structure than TP, which is higher than AgrOP. Now, with Schützes’s
reorganization, TP precedes AgrSP, which precedes AgrOP. Subjects (quirky or nonquirky)
all need to end up in Spec,TP to check their abstract subject licensing feature. Nominative
elements must move to Spec,AgrSP to check their nominative case. The subject, then, will
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always be higher in the tree than the object. This leads to another assumption that Schütze
makes for his analysis. That is, that the subject must c-command the direct object. His
reordered tree structure accomplishes this, but this assumption is not necessary, as evidenced
by the differing topicalization shown in 7–10. Icelandic allows sentences where the object
precedes the subject, so this as a criterion for reorganizing the tree structure holds no water.
3.1.2 Summary
While Schütze (1993) provides an analysis for the Icelandic quirky case data in a Min-
imalist framework, Minimalism has moved on. Many of the assumptions Schütze takes for
granted are now unnecessary in a theory of syntax. His use of AgrS and AgrO, as well as
the abstract subject and object licensing features, can all be eliminated from the theory on
independent grounds. Furthermore, the assumption that the subject needs to c-command the
object, a key assumption for Schütze’s analysis and tree reorganization, has no motivation
when considering other empirical data from Icelandic.
3.2 Sigurðsson (1996)
Sigurðsson’s (1996) analysis for Icelandic relies on specifier-head agreement, AgrXPs,
and a notion of featural complementarity. I will focus my discussion here on Sigurðsson’s
notion of featural complementarity.
3.2.1 F-Government and Featural Complementarity
Sigurðsson argues that the quirky subject never controls verb agreement. On the contrary,
the nominative nonsubjects discussed in the paper are the ones to trigger agreement on the
verb. The quirky subject’s failure to trigger agreement results from the idea of featural
complementarity adopted by Sigurðsson, along with feature-/F-government.
In this system, F-government is visualized on the F-governing head or on its F-governee,
but not both. Applying this to the Icelandic quirky subject data, agreement is visible on the
verb when F-government is realized on the head (the verb, adjective, and/or participial),
and blocked when F-government is realized on the F-governee (the quirky subject).
This ties into Sigurðsson’s claim of featural complementarity. That is, that “the featural
specification of the two is visualized either on the head or the specifier.” Nonagreeing/default
verb forms are considered default or unspecified, and agreeing verb forms are specified.
In addition, Sigurðsson treats structural case as unspecified, and inherent/lexical case as
specified. Following from Sigurðsson’s use of F-government and featural complementarity,
this system will either allow feature specification on a head (verb agreement) or on its
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specifier (nonagreement/quirky case).
Sigurðsson’s system disallows both over- and under-specification, due to economy of
representation (Taraldsen 1994). Expressing a feature on both the head and its specifier
(quirky case with agreement on the verb) overspecifies, and is ruled out due to economy
considerations. On the other hand, failing to express the feature on either the head or the
specifier leads to an underspecification. While this seems to explain the Icelandic data in
Sigurðsson’s view, it does not hold crosslinguistically. Sigurðsson notes that Georgian allows
verb agreement with an inherently case-marked NP. To get around this fact, Sigurðsson
proposes that featural complementarity is a parametric option for languages to make, but
provides no additional explanation.
3.2.2 Summary
Sigurðsson (1996) provides an analysis of Icelandic quirky case by adopting a system
reliant on specifier-head agreement, AgrXPs, and a notion of featural complementarity. As
with the Schütze (1993) analysis, external motivations suggest that AgrXPs are semantically
vacuous and have no place in a strong Minimalist theory of syntax. In addition, more recent
iterations of Minimalism shy away from specifier-head agreement, instead opting for a probe-
goal system that does not rely on a special structural configuration. Finally, as Sigurðsson
himself shows, the notion of featural complementarity is not universal. While this notion
may describe the Icelandic pattern, the system as a whole that Sigurðsson adopts does not
fit easily into the Minimalist system that I adopt.
3.3 Boeckx (2000)
Boeckx (2000) describes various agreement patterns in Icelandic quirky constructions.
He posits that when a quirky subject is present, agreement with the nominative object is
only partial (number but not person), despite this not being totally reflected in the empirical
data. Because only 3rd person nominative objects are allowed, 3rd person agreement is the
only observed agreement in Icelandic quirky subject sentences, but Boeckx ignores this.
Boeckx adopts Bonet’s (1994) Person-Case Constraint (PCC), the notion of Point-of-View
(PoV), and a Distributed Morphology framework to account for these agreement patterns.
Boeckx’s analysis also relies on an AgrXP-based approach to explaining the Icelandic data.
3.3.1 The Person-Case Constraint and Point-of-View
Boeckx’s (2000) analysis of Icelandic quirky agreement patterns relies on Bonet’s (1994)
Person-Case-Constraint (PCC). The PCC states that when a dative element is present, 1st
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or 2nd person on another element is blocked. Using the PCC, when a quirky subject is
present, a 1st or 2nd person object is prevented, yielding the Icelandic pattern detailed
above. However, the PCC as Boeckx uses it is more of an observation than an explanation;
it does not tell us why 1st/2nd person is blocked when dative is present, only that it is.
In order to attempt to explain why 1st/2nd person are blocked, Boeckx (2000) expands
the PCC into something he describes as Point-of-View (PoV). PoV is encoded by [+Person],
and must be checked by a PoV-checking head. Boeckx notes a handful of authors who
make reference to a PoV-checking projection in the structure (Culicover 1992; Laka 1990;
Uriagereka 1995a,b), but leaves the specifics vague. However, Boeckx notes that PoV must
be checked, in effect forcing the DP to check an otherwise interpretable [Person] feature.
Note that 3rd person has no [Person], so it will be unaffected by the PCC and PoV.
In an Icelandic quirky subject sentence, the quirky subject will move to the PoV-checking
projection, since it must check PoV. Since this position is now filled by the quirky subject,
the nominative object cannot move there. If the nominative object is 1st or 2nd person, it
will have an unchecked PoV feature, which leads to a crash.
PoV appears capable of explaining the person restriction in quirky constructions. How-
ever, PoV does not seem to apply in other constructions. For example, in sentences with
both a quirky subject and quirky object, one would expect both to need to check PoV.
But with only one PoV-checking projection, that seems impossible. Despite this, these types
of quirky sentences are grammatical, as I have shown in 3. Similarly, PoV as described by
Boeckx only mentions 1st and 2nd person, not nominative objects specifically. If this is
so, 1st or 2nd person accusative objects in nominative-accusative constructions should also
need to check PoV. If the nominative subject also needs to check PoV, however, we would
expect another crash. Icelandic does allow nominative-accusative sentences with both 1st or
2nd person subjects and 1st or 2nd person objects, though, so the idea of PoV as a general
concept seems to fall short here.
3.3.2 Distributed Morphology and Multiple Agreement
In addition to his use of the PCC and PoV, Boeckx bases his analysis of Icelandic in a
Distributed Morphology framework (Halle and Marantz 1993). Using Distributed Morphol-
ogy, Boeckx argues that the verb actually agrees fully with the quirky subject, but that this
agreement is not realized morphologically. Due to the absence of morphological agreement
from the quirky subject, there is room left on the verb for agreement morphology from the
object.
In a quirky subject sentence, the finite verb will first try to agree with the quirky subject.
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Boeckx argues that it does indeed establish a full agreement relation. However, due to what
Boeckx describes as a “Generalized Doubly Filled Comp Filter,” 3rd person agreement is
forced on the verb. The quirky case morphology on the quirky subject already encodes the
necessary information, so agreement does not need to be visible on the verb as well. This is
similar to Sigurðsson’s (1996) use of economy of representation. Because the relevant featural
information is already encoded on the quirky subject, also expressing it on the verb would
be an overspecification.
Since the quirky subject did not leave any morphology on the verb, the nominative
object is free to add its morphology to the verb when it checks nominative case. This
explains the apparent object agreement facts, even though Boeckx treats it as syntactic
subject agreement.
3.3.3 Summary
The analysis presented in Boeckx (2000) is able to explain the Icelandic quirky agreement
facts at first glance. After digging deeper, we can see that many of his assumptions are
insufficiently justified or fail to account for all of the relevant data. In this section, I will
briefly explain a few of the areas where this analysis falls short.
First, as mentioned in the preceding two sections, AgrXPs have no place modern Mini-
malism. Boeckx relies on these projections for his analysis to work. Despite AgrXPs being
eliminated from the theory, they are not Boeckx’s greatest shortcoming.
Boeckx also fails to notice some important trends in the data. Specifically, Boeckx does
not consider a uniform pattern of agreement with nominative objects, instead positing
different agreement patterns depending on the person of the nominative object. Second,
Boeckx relies heavily on the PCC and PoV to explain the Icelandic data. While these may
prove fruitful, Boecxk does not provide an adequate explanation of these notions. He takes
the PCC as a generalization without justifying or explaining it, and he adopts PoV without
pointing to a specific functional projection in the structure.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Boeckx ignores huge swaths of data in formu-
lating his analysis. Boeckx’s use of PoV-checking with 1st and 2nd person DPs and quirky
DPs leaves a large gap. Some ungrammatical sentences that Boeckx uses as representative
examples for PoV become grammatical when reordered. This is despite the fact that in his
system, the quirky DP should still need to check its PoV feature. Boeckx also ignores 1st
and 2nd person DPs in nonquirky sentences. If 1st and 2nd person nominative objects are
blocked in quirky subject sentences due to needing to move to a PoV projection that is
occupied by the dative quirky subject, nonquirky sentences with 1st/2nd person subjects
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and 1st/2nd person objects should be ruled out for the same reason.
3.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I have described three previous analyses of the Icelandic quirky subject
data. Schütze (1993) provides an analysis that relies on AgrXPs, Case and Licensing features,
and a reorganization of the standard syntactic tree structure to explain the Icelandic data.
Sigurðsson’s (1996) analysis also adopts AgrXPs, but further adds the notions of featural
complementarity and economy of feature specification to explain the data. Boeckx (2000)
takes a different approach. His analysis does adopt AgrXPs, but it is based primarily in
Distributed Morphology, and also makes use of the Person-Case Constraint and Point-of-
View.
As explained by their authors, all three of these approaches seem capable of explaining
the Icelandic quirky subject data, but they all have their own serious shortcomings. In
addition, the analyses presented in this chapter all predate the version of the Minimalist
Program that I adopt as my theoretical framework in Chapter 2.
CHAPTER 4
PROPOSALS
In this chapter, I describe four potential analyses to account for the Icelandic quirky
subject data. First, I look at a ϕ-stacking approached based in Richards’s (2013) analysis
of case-stacking in Lardil. Second, I consider a complex dependency account for the data
from López (2008). Next, I analyze how split ϕ probing might be able to explain the data.
Finally, I consider a defective T analysis, where T lacks [Person] in quirky subject sentences.
All four of these analyses seem initially capable of explaining the Icelandic data to some
degree; however, all except the defective T analysis require undesirable or non-Minimalist
assumptions that make them suboptimal. The defective T analysis can explain the data
without relying on these undesirable assumptions. For this reason, I choose to adopt the
defective T analysis for explaining the Icelandic quirky subject data.
4.1 ϕ-Stacking
In this section, I will show how a ϕ-stacking approach to Icelandic quirky case might
work. This analysis involves full agreement between the quirky subject and T. After T agrees
with the quirky subject, the nominative object triggers agreement with T, overriding the
agreement from the quirky subject. This ϕ-stacking is based on Richards (2013) analysis of
case-stacking in Lardil.
Richards shows that languages like Japanese and Lardil can stack morphemes. When the
original morpheme is semantically uninterpretable, it gets deleted. Only semantically inter-
pretable morphemes remain. In this Japanese example, uninterpretable nominative/accusative





Richards 2013: ex 1, p 42
16
Like Japanese and Lardil, Russian replaces semantically uninterpretable case with new
morphology. In contrast, Russian does not allow stacking new case morphology on a DP
with interpretable case. Instead, the original semantically interpretable morpheme remains.
In this example, uninterpretable accusative case is replaced by genitive, but interpretable




















‘Anna isn’t writing a letter with a pen.’
Richards 2013: ex 2, p 43
The main idea from Richards (2013) that I adopt for this ϕ-stacking approach is that
semantically interpretable morphology cannot be replaced, but semantically uninterpretable
morphology can be. Before I go over the derivations for quirky and nonquirky sentences
using this approach, I will first go over some key assumptions this proposal must make.
4.1.1 Assumptions
The ϕ-stacking analysis that I describe in this section relies on major assumptions about
agreement and movement. The first major assumption is that T can agree with two different
DPs in quirky constructions. This assumption goes against standard analyses of agreement,
which state that once T’s uninterpretable ϕ-features are valued, they are deleted from the
derivation, which prevents T from agreeing with another DP for ϕ (Chomsky 2001). In the
ϕ-stacking analysis, however, T first agrees with the quirky subject and then agrees a second
time with the nominative object. This leads to two other major assumptions.
First, the secondary agree relation between T and the nominative object is optional.
Or, at least, the overt realization of the secondary agree relation must be optional. If T’s
ϕ-features are already checked by the quirky subject, there is no need to check them with a
second DP. In this scenario, we would expect to see T agreeing always with the quirky
subject, barring some economy restriction. This optionality here achieves the observed
number asymmetry with topicalization in quirky subject sentences; for this section, however,
I focus exclusively on sentences where agreement with the nominative object does occur. In-
dependent support for a system with multiple agreement comes from Schütze (2003). Schütze
argues that Icelandic has a restriction that requires the verb to agree with both the subject
and the nominative DP, if any. In nominative-accusative sentences, these two criteria are
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satisfied by the same element (the nominative subject). In quirky subject sentences, however,
this leads to multiple agreement, with the quirky subject fulfilling the subject requirement
and the nominative object fulfilling the nominative requirement. Such a generalization may
make multiple agreement more agreeable, but Schütze does not explain why this restriction
might exist in Icelandic in the first place, nor how it would function.
Another assumption that the ϕ-stacking analysis relies on is that although T can agree
with both the quirky subject and nominative object in quirky case constructions, T can only
ever agree with the subject in nominative-accusative sentences. There is no data to indicate
that T can agree with an accusative object in nominative-accusative sentences. The goal of
these proposals is to explain the Icelandic quirky phenomena, yet these assumptions seem to
create further unexplained asymmetries between quirky and nonquirky constructions unless
we adopt Schütze’s (2003) unexplained system of multiple agreement.
One final assumption that this analysis makes use of is the assumption that [Person],
exclusively in quirky subject sentences or possibly generally, is semantically interpretable in
the sense I adopt from Richards (2013). This assumption does create an asymmetry between
[Person] and the other ϕ-features, but the empirical data seem to support such a distinction.
4.1.2 Derivations
In this section, I will provide derivations for both quirky and nonquirky sentences in
the ϕ-stacking analysis. I show why quirky subject sentences with 3rd person nominative
objects are grammatical and why quirky subject sentences with 1st or 2nd person nominative
objects are ungrammatical. I conclude by showing a derivation for two nonquirky sentences.
The following three examples (16–18) show the derivations for quirky subject sentences
using this ϕ-stacking approach. In 16, T probes its ϕ-features for the first time and finds
the quirky subject, where it checks [Person], [Number], and [Gender]. This will be the same




QSU[pX, nX, gX] V′
OB V
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In 17, we see what happens next when the nominative object is 3rd person. T probes its
ϕ-features a second time, now finding the nominative object as the goal. T will attempt to
replace its ϕ morphology from the quirky subject with new morphology from the nominative
object. The [Person] feature on T that was acquired from the quirky subject cannot be
replaced, being semantically interpretable, but this is not a problem. The nominative object,
being 3rd person, has no [Person] feature at all, so it cannot even try to replace the
irreplaceable [Person] on T. Instead, T only replaces its [Number] and [Gender] values with






When the nominative object is 1st or 2nd person, as in 18, we encounter a problem. As in
17, T will probe ϕ for the second time and find the nominative object. This time, however,
the nominative object does have a [Person] feature. Now, since the T cannot replace its
[Person] morphology with new morphology, T and the nominative object cannot effectively
establish an agree relation. T and the nominative object will be relatively ϕ-defective, the





OB[p/, nX, gX] V
Problems arise when the quirky subject is 3rd person in these constructions. If the quirky
subject is 3rd person, it will lack a [Person] feature. Now, when T’s ϕ-features probe the
first time, they will not receive a value from the quirky subject for [Person]. When T probes
its ϕ-features the second time, finding the nominative object, it should be possible to gain a
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[Person] specification. Since there is no irreplaceable [Person] value from the quirky subject,
nothing is stopping a 1st or 2nd person nominative object from imposing its [Person] value
on T. If this were the case, we would see grammatical examples with 1st or 2nd person
nominative objects, but we do not.
One potential way around this would be to tinker with the mechanism by which T gets its
default agreement specifications, and by also assuming that [Person] generally is semantically
interpretable (that is, irreplaceable). If the mechanism for T receiving default agreement
precedes T’s second ϕ-feature probe, perhaps the default specification for [Person] blocks a
1st or 2nd person nominative object. This account would require further explanation, but
may prove fruitful.
Nonquirky sentences in this ϕ-stacking analysis do not seem to encounter any problems.
Since T’s ϕ-features only probe once in nonquirky sentences (if we do not adopt the mul-
tiple agreement suggested by Schütze 2003), we do not need to worry about replaceable
morphology. I show derivations for nonquirky sentences in 19–20.
In a nonquirky sentence with a 1st or 2nd person nominative subject, such as in 19, T
will probe its ϕ-features and find the subject as the goal. T will check all of its ϕ-features
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With a 3rd person nominative subject, things go smoothly. While T has [Person] and
the 3rd person nominative subject does not, this is not a problem for this analysis. T will
simply receive a default value for [Person], and the derivation will still converge. 20 shows
an example of this. T will probe its ϕ-features and find the 3rd person nominative subject,









In this section, I have shown derivations for all relevant combinations of both quirky
and nonquirky sentences. In 16–18, I showed a derivation for quirky subject sentences with
both 3rd person and 1st or 2nd person nominative objects. I showed that 17, with a 3rd
person object, was grammatical specifically because it lacks a [Person] feature. This avoids an
agreement mismatch due to T’s irreplaceable [Person] specification from the quirky subject.
I also showed why 18 is ungrammatical. Because T’s [Person] specification from the quirky
subject is irreplaceable, the 1st or 2nd person nominative object and T are relatively ϕ-
incomplete, which leads the derivation to crash.
In addition to the quirky subject examples, I also showed how the ϕ-stacking analysis
might handle nonquirky sentences. For nonquirky sentences, T will only probe ϕ once, so
we do not run into the problem of irreplaceable features with nonquirky sentences.
4.1.3 Summary
The ϕ-stacking analysis presented in this section relies on the possibility for multiple
agreement of T. In quirky subject sentences, T must agree with both the quirky subject and
the nominative object. In addition, this analysis requires that the person valuation on T
from the quirky subject is semantically interpretable, à la Richards (2013), so it cannot be
replaced by a new specification. This irreplaceability of [Person] yields the 1st and 2nd person
restriction. Because 1st and 2nd person nominative subjects have [Person], a mismatch
will occur when T tries to probe ϕ a second time, leading to relative ϕ-incompleteness
and a crash. For nonquirky sentences, T only probes ϕ once, so there is no problem with
irreplaceable features.
Despite its moderate success, the ϕ-stacking analysis presented in this section has nu-
merous shortcomings that make it insufficient. Primarily, the assumptions required for this
analysis have weak theoretical backing. That T can agree with multiple DPs goes against
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standard conceptions of ϕ-features on T, and treating [Person] as semantically interpretable
does not gain anything. While we do see an empirical asymmetry between 1st/2nd person
and 3rd person, the ϕ-stacking proposal leaves it unexplained. Finally, this proposal does
not work well for all of the relevant data. Importantly, a 3rd person quirky subject causes
problems that require a very nonstandard, yet still not fully explained solution. Due to these
inelegant workarounds and the generally nonstandard assumptions that need to be made,
this ϕ-stacking analysis is not sufficient to answer my research questions about Icelandic
quirky subject sentences.
4.2 Complex Dependency
In this section, I will describe an analysis for Icelandic that treats T, the quirky subject,
and the nominative object as a complex dependency. This analysis is described by López
(2008). López claims that this analysis explains the observed object agreement facts, as
well as the 1st and 2nd person restriction on nominative objects. First, I will go over
López’s theoretical assumptions for this analysis, which differ markedly from those I adopt
and describe in Chapter 2. After my description of López’s theoretical framework and
assumptions, I will provide a brief derivation for an Icelandic quirky subject sentence using
López’s system. Finally, I will conclude this section by explaining the shortcomings of López’s
complex dependency analysis, and ultimately why it is suboptimal in explaining the Icelandic
quirky subject agreement facts.
4.2.1 Assumptions
I will first explain the theoretical framework and assumptions that López (2008) adopts
in his complex dependency analysis of Icelandic object agreement and the 1st/2nd person
restriction. Because this analysis is not my own, it does not align exactly with the theoretical
framework I detailed in Chapter 2. Having said that, López’s analysis is still based in a
Minimalist framework, with some modifications and additions.
López adopts Full Sharing for his system of feature valuation, defined in 21:
(21) Full Sharing
Take a,b to be features of the same type. If a,b are involved an an Agree (p,g)
dependency, feature sharing is mandatory.
López 2008: ex 17, p 136
This essentially states that when two features of the same type enter into an Agree relation,
they must share the same value. What is interesting in López’s system is what happens when
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two unvalued features [a],[b] enter into an Agree relation with each other. Full Sharing will
require them to have the same values; however, since the two features have no values yet,
they enter into an open dependency. Instead of becoming co-valued, the features become
co-indexed. Now, if a head H probes and values [a], the dependency between [a] and [b]
forces [b] to have the same valuation as [a] and H. This Agree relation between H and the
open dependency formed between [a] and [b] forms a complex dependency.
In addition to Full Sharing, López adopts Minimal Compliance, defined in 22:
(22) Minimal Compliance
For any dependency D that obeys constraint C, any elements that are relevant for
determining whether D obeys C can be ignored for the rest of the derivation for
purposes of determining whether any other dependency D’ obeys C.
López 2008: p 141
López does not explain Minimal Compliance in detail, but he seems to suggest that if
two elements are in a dependency D, it only minimally needs to obey Full Sharing. If two
elements a and b enter into an Agree relation, they only need to satisfy Full Sharing once.
For each additional feature on a and b that agrees, Full Sharing does not need to apply.
Next, López assumes that the quirky subject has an extra layer K above the DP. K has
no ϕ-features. This will ultimately lead to the 1st/2nd person restriction, as I will show in
the derivations. López also assumes that [Person] and [Number] probe separately and in a
specific order. Specifically, López argues that [Person] probes first. This will also contribute
to the 1st/2nd person restriction and the observed object agreement facts more generally.
López makes assumptions about the nature of ϕ-features on T. He adopts that [Person]
on T probes separately and first, though he does not give an explanation for this. While
this issue is somewhat unresolved, the standard Minimalist framework that I adopt treats
ϕ-features as a bundle.
Finally, López assumes that unvalued Case can act as a probe. This is somewhat unortho-
dox. Typically it is only phasal heads that act as probes. López’s suggestion that something
that is not a phasal head which is also a maximal category acts as a probe goes against
the standard theory. These assumptions allow two nominals to enter into an Agree relation
with each other and form an open dependency. Specifically for the Icelandic analysis, this
assumption allows the quirky subject to form an open dependency with the nominative
object while having their features remain unvalued.
Next, I will provide a derivation for Icelandic using the López’s complex dependency
analysis and the assumptions detailed in this section.
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4.2.2 Derivations
Now I will provide a derivation using López’s complex dependency analysis to show
how it attempts to explain the object agreement facts and the 1st/2nd person nominative
object restriction in Icelandic quirky subject sentences. López only discusses the quirky case
examples, so I only include a derivation for a quirky subject sentence here.
First, the quirky subject probes its unvalued Case feature and finds the nominative object
as its goal. This is shown in 23a. Due to establishing an Agree relation, their Case features






Next, T’s [Person] feature probes and finds the open dependency formed by the quirky
subject and nominative object. Due to Full Sharing, T, the quirky subject, and the nomina-
tive object all need to share the same [Person] value. Since K does not have a specification
for [Person], the nominative object similarly cannot have a specification for [Person]. If the
nominative object is 1st/2nd person, the derivation will crash, due to a feature mismatch.
In 24a, the nominative object is 3rd person, so it has no [Person] specification. So, the
derivation converges without problems, since both K and the nominative object share the
same specification for [Person] (that is, no person). In 24b, the nominative object is 1st or
2nd person. When T’s [Person] probe finds the open dependency as its goal, the feature
mismatch between K and the nominative object causes the derivation to crash.
(24) a. T[p]
Probe −→




K[uiC] + OB[uiC, p, n, g]
|————–Goal————–|
After [Person] probes, T’s [Number] feature will probe. Since Full Sharing has already
been satisfied, Minimal Compliance comes into effect. It is grammatical for K, lacking
[Number], and the nominative object, possessing [Number], to form a complex dependency
with T. This is shown in 25, where a singular or plural nominative object will both be
acceptable, as long as the object is 3rd person.
(25) a. T[n]
Probe −→




K[uiC] + OB[uiC, PL, g]
|————–Goal————–|
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The object agreement facts derive here due to the formation of the open dependency
between K and the nominative object. when T probes its ϕ-features, the nominative object
will be a part of the goal. In addition, López assumes that K has no ϕ-features. When T
finds the open dependency, then, the quirky subject cannot share any ϕ-features with T.
The only place for T to receive a ϕ-feature specification is then from the nominative object.
The 1st and 2nd person nominative object restriction derives from López’s assumptions
about Full Sharing and the ϕ-featureless layer K that makes up the quirky subject. Due to
Full Sharing, the layer K and the nominative object must have the same specification for
ϕ-features. Since K has no [Person] feature, then, in order for the sentence to be grammatical
and satisfy Full Sharing, the nominative object must also not have a [Person] feature. The
way to guarantee this is by only allowing [Person]-less 3rd person nominative objects and
blocking 1st or 2nd person nominative objects.
4.2.3 Summary
In this section, I described the complex dependency analysis for Icelandic quirky case as
detailed in López (2008). This analysis requires the quirky subject and nominative object
to form an open dependency. Due to Full Sharing, their features become co-valued. When
T probes its ϕ-features, it finds this open dependency to agree with, forming a complex
dependency. Since López assumes that the quirky subject has an additional layer K with
no ϕ-features, the only way to satisfy Full Sharing is to have a 3rd person nominative
object (lacking [Person]). Otherwise, there will be a feature mismatch between K and the
nominative object, violating Full Sharing.
While López’s analysis is couched in a general Minimalist framework (making use of
Full Sharing and Minimal Compliance, for example) it requires a number of nonstandard
assumptions to get the desired results. Importantly, López assumes that the quirky subject’s
unvalued abstract Case feature can act as a probe, and that it will find the nominative object.
This is crucial to form the open dependency between K and the nominative object in the
first place, but López does not explain how or why this would work. From a Minimalist
perspective, Case is generally valued as a result of ϕ-agreement (see Preminger 2014 for
a dissenting opinion on this). This being the case, along with my previous discussion on
the standard Minimalist theory on probes generally being phasal heads, makes this crucial
assumption less than desirable.
Furthermore, the complex dependency analysis makes stipulations about ϕ-features on
the quirky subject. That is, López assumes the ϕ-featureless layer K. This is important
for achieving the 1st/2nd person nominative object restriction, but López fails to address
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a number of alternative possibilities. Importantly, he discusses Full Sharing violations in
the context of feature mismatches. However, he does not consider the possibility that Full
Sharing might be satisfied vacuously in the event that K lacks ϕ-features. If K has no [Person]
feature, any specification for [Person] on the nominative object will not lead to a feature
mismatch, since K has no competing specification for [Person]. López ignores this possibility.
Another, minor shortcoming of this complex dependency analysis is López’s failure to
address nonquirky sentences. His use of Full Sharing and Minimal Compliance allows us
to derive the observed patterns for quirky subject sentences, but it remains unclear how
these components interact in nominative-accusative sentences. If [Person] still probes first,
we would expect Full Sharing and Minimal Compliance to force [Person] agreement always,
but optionally ignore [Number] and [Gender] agreement.
Due to the nonstandard and unexplained assumptions required by this complex de-
pendency analysis, along with the large gaps in the data that López ignores, the complex
dependency analysis is not an optimal analysis for answering my research questions regarding
the Icelandic quirky subject construction data. For these reasons, I do not adopt the complex
dependency analysis.
4.3 Split ϕ Probing
The next analysis that I will describe involves split ϕ agreement. In this analysis, T
agrees with the quirky subject for [Person], but with the nominative object for [Number]
and [Gender]. This requires T’s ϕ-features to probe separately. External support for split
ϕ checking more generally comes from Sumerian (Jagersma 2010) and Yucatec. External
support specific to Icelandic comes from Sigurðsson and Holmberg (2008), who provide a
similar (yet crucially different) analysis of Icelandic quirky constructions that involves [Per-
son] probing separately from [Number] and [Gender]. The split ϕ probe analysis described
in this chapter was developed independently from the analysis of Sigurðsson and Holmberg
(2008).
4.3.1 Assumptions
This analysis makes use of the theoretical framework that I adopt in Chapter 2, with some
variation and additions. These additions include that the quirky subject remains active after
valuing its abstract Case feature, that ϕ-features on the quirky subject behave differently
than on the nominative object, and that T’s ϕ features do not probe as a single bundle, but
rather act as separate probes.
This split ϕ probe analysis requires that the quirky subject remain active even after
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valuing its Case with the verb. This means that the quirky subject still needs to have some
uninterpretable, unchecked feature after valuing Case. I label this unknown feature [f]. It
may be tempting to treat this unknown feature as the abstract Case feature, and claim that
the quirky case on the subject from the verb results from some other arrangement. However,
Preminger (2014) makes an argument against abstract case on lexically-case-marked DPs.
While Preminger adopts a rather different framework from the one I adopt, I agree with
his point about abstract Case on lexically-case-marked DPs such as quirky subjects. In
addition, the Minimalist framework that I adopt treats Case as a reflection of ϕ agreement.
Relative ϕ-completeness is a requirement for feature checking and Case licensing, but in
this analysis, the quirky subject only checks [Person]. Unless I adopt a version of López’s
assumption whereby the quirky subject only has [Person], this will not work. Thus, for this
analysis, I resort to the mysterious [f].
This analysis also requires an unorthodox treatment of ϕ-features on quirky subjects.
As I will demonstrate in the derivations, only [Person] gets checked with the quirky subject,
with [Number] and [Gender] checking with the object. Relative ϕ-completeness makes un-
grammatical a configuration where the object has [Person], [Number], and [Gender], but T
only has the latter two. This is what will derive the 1st/2nd person restriction. If we come
back to the quirky subject, however, we would expect a crash in a similar configuration. If
a 1st or 2nd person nominative object is ungrammatical because it cannot check all of its
ϕ-features with T, we would expect a quirky subject will a full ϕ set to be ungrammatical
if it only checks T’s [Person] feature.
This issue could possibly be resolved by treating quirky subjects as only having [Person],
or even by fully adopting López’s (2008) assumption that quirky subjects have no ϕ features
whatsoever. Whether we adopt that quirky subjects have all, some, or no ϕ-features, this
will cause the analysis to encounter problems similar to the ϕ-stacking analysis when we
have a 3rd person subject, quirky or not. If the subject has no [Person] feature, T’s [Person]
feature cannot receive a value from it. Now we would run into the conundrum of default
agreement timing that I discussed previously.
Another unorthodox treatment of ϕ-features this analysis uses relates to the realization
of ϕ feature specifications from the quirky subject. This split ϕ analysis argues that T
expresses [Person] agreement from the quirky subject. However, this agreement looks the
same, regardless of the person specification of the quirky subject. This requires ϕ-features
to manifest differently, depending on if the subject is quirky or nonquirky. While this would
create another quirky/nonquirky asymmetry, potential support for this idea comes from the
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notions of featural complementarity and economy of feature specification as described by
Sigurðsson (1996) and Boeckx (2000) that I discussed in Chapter 3.
Finally, the key assumption that the split ϕ probe analysis relies on is that T’s ϕ-
features probe separately to begin with. The Minimalist framework that I adopt treats
ϕ-features as a bundle that probes as a whole, but this is not uncontroversial. As I described
in the previous section, López’s (2008) complex dependency analysis relies on T’s ϕ-features
probing separately. Sigurðsson and Holmberg’s (2008) independent analysis for Icelandic also
requires split ϕ probing. While the issue of how T’s ϕ-features is not unanimously agreed
on, the split ϕ probe analysis that I describe here is nonstandard in the sense that the
Minimalist framework I adopt in Chapter 2 treats ϕ-features as a bundle.
Next, I will show how the split ϕ probe analysis attempts to derive the Icelandic quirky
subject facts using these assumptions.
4.3.2 Derivations
In this section, I will provide derivations for all relevant quirky and nonquirky sentence
types using the split ϕ probe analysis. I will first show how quirky sentences are derived,
followed by how this analysis works for nonquirky sentences.
First I will show the derivation for a quirky subject sentence with a 3rd person nominative
object. T’s [Person] feature will probe first, as shown in 26. The quirky subject will still be
active at this point, due to [f], so it acts as an intervening element for the [Person] probe.
This probe will find the quirky subject as its goal, valuing [f] on the subject and valuing
[Person] on T. Since the quirky subject has no more unvalued, uninterpretable features, it




T[pX, n, g] VP
QSU[pX, fX] V′
OB V
Next, T’s [Number] and [Gender] features will probe. Since the quirky subject is now
inactive, these two features will find the nominative object as their goal. If the object is 3rd
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person, as in 27, it will only have [Number] and [Gender]. Since T’s probe only consists of
[Number] and [Gender] at this point, when these two features find the 3rd person nominative




T[pX, nX, gX] VP
QSU V′
OB[nX, gX] V
If the nominative object is 1st or 2nd person, it will have [Person], [Number], and
[Gender]. when T’s [Number] and [Gender] features probe and find the 1st or 2nd person
nominative object as their goal, they will not be relatively ϕ-complete. Agreement will not
obtain between T and the nominative object, the object’s abstract Case feature will not be
valued, and the derivation will crash. I demonstrate this in the ungrammatical example 28.
(28) TP
T′
T[pX, nX, gX] VP
QSU V′
OB[p/, nX, gX] V
As I have demonstrated in the preceding examples, the object agreement facts in quirky
subject sentences arise due to the quirky subject’s inactivity, which makes the nominative
object the only accessible goal for T’s [Person] probe. As for the 1st and 2nd person
restriction on nominative objects in quirky subject sentences, this results from the failure to
achieve relative ϕ-completeness between T and the nominative object when the nominative
object is 1st or 2nd person.
In addition to deriving quirky subject sentences, this split ϕ probe analysis can also
derive nonquirky sentences, which I will demonstrate in the following four examples.
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As in the quirky subject examples that I have just described, in nonquirky sentences,
what will happen first is T’s [Person] feature will probe. When the nominative subject is
1st or 2nd person, things go smoothly. T’s [Person] probe will find the subject as its goal.
T will receive its [Person] value from the nominative subject. This is all shown in 29.
(29) TP
T′
T[pX, n, g] vP
v′




After [Person] probes and finds the nominative subject, T’s [Number] and [Gender] will
probe. The nominative subject remains active, since it has not yet valued its abstract Case
feature. When [Number] and [Gender] probe, they will be able to find the nominative subject
as their goal. T will receive specifications for [Number] and [Gender] from the nominative
subject, and the nominative subject will value its abstract Case.
(30) TP
T′
T[p,, nX, gX] vP
vP





Things become less clear when the nominative subject is 3rd person. If the nominative
subject lacks [Person] (being 3rd person), we might expect T’s [Person] probe to skip over
it and find the accusative object as its goal. The empirical data disagree with this result;
in nonquirky sentences, the verb agrees with the nominative subject for [Person], unless we
decide to adopt the controversial assumptions about the representation of ϕ-features that I
touched on previously.
To avoid these kinds of assumptions, we want T’s [Person] probe to agree with either the
nominative subject or nothing at all (receiving a default specification). One possible way
to do this is by treating the notion of an intervener as something that possesses the same
kind of feature, rather than needing the specific feature itself. By treating all ϕ-features as
the same type of feature, we can cause the nominative subject to be found by T’s [Person]
feature, and things will go more smoothly. However, we have already seen an asymmetry
between [Person] and the other two ϕ-features, and treating ϕ-features the same way moves
us away from treating them separately to begin with.
When T’s [Person] feature probes, it will still find the nominative subject as its goal,
even though the 3rd person subject lacks a [Person] feature. In this case, T’s will receive a
default specification for [Person], rather than receiving a value from the subject (Corbett
2006). This is demonstrated in 31.
(31) TP
T′
T[pDFT , n, g] vP
v′




Following the [Person] probe, T’s [Number] and [Gender] features will probe and find
the 3rd person nominative subject as the goal, just as with 1st or 2nd person nominative
subjects. The nominative subject will also value its abstract Case feature, and the derivation




T[pX, nX, gX] vP
vP





As I have demonstrated, the split ϕ probe analysis is capable of representing both quirky
and nonquirky sentences with some success. The object agreement facts arise due to the
quirky subject’s inactivity after checking with T’s [Person]. The only accessible goal for T’s
[Number] and [Gender] probes then becomes the nominative object. The restriction on 1st
and 2nd person nominative objects arises due to relative ϕ-incompleteness. When T probes
[Number] and [Gender], a nominative object that also has [Person] will lead the derivation
to crash.
While I have attempted to show how the split ϕ probe analysis can represent the Icelandic
quirky and nonquirky data, there are some caveats. As I discussed in §4.3.1, this analysis
requires some questionable and nonstandard assumptions with regards to unchecked features
on the quirky subject. The analysis I describe here requires the quirky subject to value T’s
[Person] feature, but requires an unvalued, uninterpretable feature of its own to remain
active. While abstract Case might be the go-to choice, arguments from Preminger (2014)
suggest that lexically-case-marked DPs do not have an abstract Case feature. To get around
this, I simply call the unknown uninterpretable feature on the quirky subject [f].
In addition, numerous problems pop up when the subject (quirky or nonquirky) is
3rd person. Resolving them requires further nonstandard assumptions about the timing
of default agreement, the treatment of ϕ-features and interveners, and the representation of
ϕ-features on DPs.
One way around some of these problems might be to abandon the Activity Condition.
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Sigurðsson and Holmberg (2008) provide an independent split ϕ probe analysis, with one of
the key differences being their rejection of the Activity Condition. After checking [Person],
the quirky subject simply moves out of the way, becoming an impossible goal for T’s
[Number] and [Gender] probes. This may solve the problem of the mysterious feature [f],
which will no longer be needed, but may not resolve issues related to a 3rd person subject.
Furthermore, although it remains controversial, their use of the Activity Condition goes
against my adopted theoretical framework. While this may prove fruitful for future research,
I do not investigate it further at this time.
4.4 Defective T
In this section, I will describe the analysis that I adopt to explain my research questions
regarding the Icelandic quirky subject agreement facts and restrictions: the defective T
analysis. In this analysis, T is ϕ-defective in quirky subject sentences, where it lacks a
[Person] feature. When T probes its ϕ-features in a quirky subject sentence, it checks only
[Number] and [Gender] with the nominative object. The object agreement facts result from
the quirky subject’s inactivity. The restriction on 1st and 2nd person nominative objects
results from relative ϕ-incompleteness.
In this section, I will start by going over the remaining assumptions necessary for the
defective T analysis outside of my Minimalist theoretical framework as described in Chapter
2. After that, I will show detailed derivations for all relevant Icelandic sentence types. I
conclude this section with a summary of the defective T analysis and the remaining issues
that this analysis leaves to be solved.
4.4.1 Assumptions
The defective T analysis makes use of the Minimalist theoretical framework and assump-
tions that I describe in Chapter 2. The only major assumption that the defective T analysis
requires is that T be ϕ-defective in quirky subject sentences in the first place.
In order to address why it is the case that T is [Person] defective in quirky subject
sentences, I turn to the standard assumptions about defectiveness and the nature of quirky
subjects more generally. While this explanation is only tentative for the time being, these
theoretical components can be combined in such a way as to potentially explain this remain-
ing assumption while staying within the bounds of a Minimalist framework.
Quirky subjects are standardly assumed to never be agentive (Schütze 1993). If T
is strongly linked to the lexical verb by being a part of the verb’s extended projection,
this specification of nonagentivity may be reflected on T as well. Returning to my earlier
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discussion of defectiveness in Chapter 2, Corbett describes defectiveness as relating to what
can be reasonably expected. If T is linked to the verb, then in quirky subject sentences, if
the quirky verb has the expectation of being nonagentive, T may also have this expectation.
Relating T’s expectation to lack agentivity to specific ϕ-features is somewhat stipulative,
but it may get the job done. As I explain in Chapter 2, [Person] may have further specifica-
tions such as [participant] and [author] (Preminger 2014). 3rd person NPs have been argued
to lack [Person], or at least the subnodes [participant] and [author]. The notion of agent could
relate to these deeper specifications of [Person]. If [agent] can be related to [participant]
or [author], the absence of agentivity can correlate with the absence of [participant] and
[author]. As for a DP, this would signal 3rd person. This could manifest the same way
on T. If quirky verbs are never agentive, and T is tied to the lexical verb, then T cannot
be expected to specify [participant], [author], or even the entire [Person] feature. That is,
T lacking [Person] in quirky subject sentences results from the same featureal structure
whereby 3rd person DPs lack [Person]. While this link may be tenuous, the relation between
T, the lexical verb, and the prohibition on agentivity may be able to explain why T lacks
[Person] in quirky subject constructions.
Another potential explanation for defective T is stipulating a selection restriction on
quirky verbs. Certain functional elements can restrict the complements with which they
appear, so this may extend to Icelandic quirky verbs and T. Simply put, quirky verbs
cannot appear with nondefective T. One independent example of this is the restriction of
progressive aspect appearing with certain stative verbs, as in 33. This is a complex issue,
and I put a full description of it aside for the time being.
(33) a. He is climbing the tree.
b. * He is believing in ghosts.
I have shown two tentative explanations for the existence of defective T in quirky subject
sentences, but additional work needs to be done to claim either of these with any certainty.
4.4.2 Derivations
Now that I have gone over the remaining theoretical assumption that needs to be made
for the defective T analysis, I will show derivations using this analysis for both quirky
subject sentences and nonquirky sentences. As before, I will start by showing derivations
for the quirky subject sentences. I provide examples with both 3rd and 1st or 2nd person
nominative objects. Unlike some of the previous analyses, the [Person] specification of the
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quirky subject will not cause any problems. Next, I will show how the defective T analysis
runs smoothly for nonquirky sentences, no matter the [Person] specification.
In 34, the quirky subject checks Case with the verb, making the subject inactive. T then
probes to check its ϕ-features. Since the quirky subject is inactive, T will find the 3rd person
nominative object as its goal. T, lacking [Person], and the 3rd person nominative object,
also lacking [Person], are relatively ϕ-complete, so T checks its ϕ-features and the object





OB[CaseX, nX, gX] V
In the ungrammatical 35, things start to proceed as before. The quirky subject checks
Case with the verb, and T probes to check its ϕ-features. However, if the nominative object
is 1st or 2nd person, it will have a [Person] feature. When T finds the nominative object as





OB[Case/, p/, nX, gX] V
My defective T analysis also derives nonquirky sentences. T is only ϕ-defective in quirky
subject sentences. T in nonquirky sentences will have a full ϕ-feature set. In 36, T’s ϕ-features
will probe and find the 3rd person nominative subject as its goal. Even though T has
[Person] and the nominative subject does not, this still meets the requirements of relative
ϕ-completeness as I define it in Chapter 2. All of the subject’s ϕ-features have a correlate
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on T, so the derivation converges. T checks its [Number] and [Gender] with the nominative
subject, and will receive a default value for [Person] (Corbett 2006).
(36) TP
T′
T[p,, nX, gX] vP
vP




With a 1st or 2nd person nominative subject, as in 37, things go even smoother. T’s
ϕ-features will probe and find the nominative subject as its goal. T and the nominative
subject are relatively ϕ-complete, so the derivation will converge. T will get its values for
[Person], [Number], and [Gender] from the nominative subject.
(37) TP
T′
T[pX, nX, gX] vP
vP




In the preceding four examples, I have shown how my defective T analysis can derive the
observed patterns for both Icelandic quirky subject sentences as well as nonquirky sentences.
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For the quirky subject sentences, object agreement obtains because the quirky subject is
inactive, and therefore inaccessible to T. When T probes its ϕ-features (only [Number] and
[Gender] in quirky subject sentences), the only accessible goal is the nominative object. If
the nominative object is 3rd person, it will be relatively ϕ-complete with respect to T, and
the derivation will converge. If the nominative object is 1st or 2nd person, it will not be
relatively ϕ-complete with respect to T; the 1st or 2nd person nominative object DP will
have an extra ϕ-feature that does not have a correlate on T (that is, the [Person] feature),
which causes the derivation to crash.
For nonquirky sentences, T has a complete set of ϕ-features, and the derivations go
much more smoothly. With a 1st or 2nd person nominative subject, T will check [Person],
[Number], and [Gender] with the nominative subject. The nominative subject will value
its abstract Case with T, and the derivation will converge. With a 3rd person nominative
subject, T will check [Number] and [Gender] with the nominative subject. T will receive
a default value for [Person] later in the derivation (Corbett 2006). The nominative subject
once again will value its abstract Case with T, and the derivation will converge.
4.4.3 Summary
My defective T analysis involves a ϕ-defective T that lacks [Person] in quirky subject
constructions. As I have demonstrated with the examples, this analysis is capable of deriving
both quirky and nonquirky Icelandic sentences with any specification for [Person] on the
subject or object. The important assumption that remains to be explained is that T is
ϕ-defective in quirky subject constructions in the first place. As I tentatively described in
§4.4.1, this may relate to T being in the extended projection of V. Quirky verbs are never
agentive, so if T is in the projection of V, then perhaps this lack of agentivity translates
into the absence of [participant], [author], or even the entire [Person] feature on T, à la
Preminger (2014). If this is the case, however, we may run into problems with unergative
verbs that still allow 1st and 2nd person subjects. A possible alternative explanation for
defective T in quirky subject sentences could be in a selection requirement on quirky verbs
or in a semantic restriction on quirky verbs, rather than something syntactic.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I have described four possible analyses to explain the Icelandic quirky
subject data. First, I showed a ϕ-stacking analysis based on Richards’s (2013) case-stacking.
This analysis seems capable of representing the Icelandic data, but requires a number of
undesirable assumptions about how ϕ-features function on T and on DPs. In addition, this
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analysis creates a new asymmetry between quirky and nonquirky sentences.
Second, I described an analysis from López that treats T, the quirky subject, and the
nominative object as a complex dependency. Once again, this analysis seems generally capa-
ble of deriving the Icelandic patterns, but it suffers from similar problems as the ϕ-stacking
analysis. The assumptions required for this analysis to work are not fully explained and
generally nonstandard, and the analysis glosses over some potential alternatives without
discussion.
Third, I considered an analysis based on splitting the [Person] probe from [Number] and
[Gender]. This sort of analysis reasonably derives both quirky and nonquirky data, but relies
on some unfounded stipulations, for example, that the quirky subject remains active after
valuing its Case with the verb, and that [Person] behaves differently than other ϕ-features.
Finally, I described an analysis where T is ϕ-defective in quirky subject constructions,
specifically lacking [Person]. Like the previous three analyses, this analysis can explain the
Icelandic data. It derives the empirical patterns for both quirky and nonquirky sentences,
and it does not require the nonstandard assumptions and stipulations that the other analyses
rely on to function. While the key assumption of the defective T analysis—that T is defective
in the first place—needs explanation, I have provided two tentative explanations that are
built from a standardly Minimalist framework.
The defective T analysis derives both the object agreement facts and the 1st and 2nd
person nominative object restriction in a more elegant, Minimalist manner than the other
three analyses presented in this chapter.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
There have been numerous different analyses of Icelandic quirky case and agreement
facts. In this thesis, I have described seven: three legacy and four modern analyses. Most
of these analyses come with their share of theoretical shortcomings. Many of the earlier
analyses of Icelandic, three of which I describe in Chapter 3, predate the current version
of Minimalism, and thus do not make use of the same Minimalist components that I adopt
in Chapter 2. While the analyses that I describe in Chapter 4 adhere to more Minimalist
ideals, three of them are still suboptimal for a variety of reasons. In this final chapter, I will
provide a review of the relevant Icelandic data, my Minimalist theoretical framework, and
a recap of the four potential modern analyses of the Icelandic data that I describe in full
detail in Chapter 4, as well as pointing out possible areas for future research.
5.1 Review of Data and Research Questions
The Icelandic construction that I focus on in this thesis is the quirky subject sentence
with a nominative direct object. In these constructions, the finite verb agrees with the object,
rather than with the subject, unlike in nominative-accusative sentences. Furthermore, 1st
and 2nd person nominative objects are blocked entirely in this construction, even though
they are allowed as quirky subjects, nominative subjects, and as accusative objects.
In 36 (repeated from 5), I show the object agreement facts that arise in Icelandic quirky
subject sentences. Here, the finite verb agrees with the nominative object for number, rather







‘She found the boys boring.’
Sigurðsson 1993: ex 3, p 1
In 39 (repeated from 6), I show the 1st and 2nd person restriction on nominative objects.
Here, no kind of agreement on the verb will be grammatical. A 1st or 2nd person nominative
39







‘She found us boring.’
Sigurðsson 1993: ex 56, p 24
These representative pieces of data led me to my two research questions. First, why
do we observe object agreement in quirky subject sentences? Second, why are 1st and 2nd
person nominative objects blocked? I address both of these questions within a Minimalist
theoretical framework, which I discussed in detail in Chapter 2, and will review briefly in
the following section.
5.2 Review of Theoretical Framework
For the analyses that I describe in Chapter 4, including the defective T analysis that I
adopt, I adopt a syntactic framework based in the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995, 2000,
2001, 2004). Minimalist theoretical components that I adopt include the operation Agree, a
probe-goal system of agreement, the Activity Condition, and relative ϕ-completeness. Other
theoretical notions that I adopt outside of the core of the Minimalist Program include the
notion that 3rd person DPs lack a [Person] feature (adopted by Sigurðsson 1996, Boeckx
2000, and Preminger 2014), and that T can be ϕ-defective (supported by Hornstein et al.
2005 and Corbett 2006).
5.3 Summary of Analyses
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, I considered four potential Minimalist analyses of the Icelandic
quirky subject data: (i) a ϕ-stacking analysis based on Richards (2013); (ii) an analysis by
López (2008) that treats T, the quirky subject, and the nominative object all as a complex
dependency; (iii) a split ϕ probe analysis where [Person] probes separately from [Number]
and [Gender]; and (iv) a defective T analysis where T lacks [Person] in quirky subject
sentences. While all four of these analyses are couched in a Minimalist framework and can
generally derive the observed patterns, the defective T analysis best explains the Icelandic
data. I provide an overview of the extra assumptions required beyond my adopted Minimalist
framework for each analysis in 40. As 40 shows, while each of the analyses that I have
described comes with their share of extra assumptions, the defective T analysis that I adopt
for Icelandic requires the fewest stipulative assumptions beyond my Minimalist framework
that I adopt in Chapter 2. Furthermore, the lone remaining assumption of my defective T
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analysis may be tentatively explainable while staying within the bounds of my Minimalist
syntactic framework.
(40) a. ϕ-Stacking
i. T’s ϕ-features can agree with two different DPs in quirky subject sentences
ii. The secondary agree relation between T and nominative object is optional
iii. T only agrees once in nonquirky sentences
iv. [Person] on T is semantically interpretable
b. Complex Dependency
i. ϕ-featureless layer K on quirky subjects
ii. [Person] probes first and separately
iii. Unvalued Case can act as a probe
c. Split ϕ Probe
i. [Person] probes first and separately
ii. Mystery feature [f] on the quirky subject
iii. Only [Person] checks with the quirky subject
iv. [Person] from the quirky subject always realized the same
d. Defective T
i. T lacks [Person] in quirky subject sentences
While I argue for my defective T analysis for Icelandic, there is still more work to be
done to fully understand the various Icelandic quirky case and agreement phenomena. I will
briefly discuss some future research directions in the following section.
5.4 Further Work
Out of the four modern Minimalist analyses I have presented in this thesis, my defective
T analysis derives and explains the Icelandic quirky subject data the best. However, Icelandic
quirky case is by no means solved; there is always more work to be done in order to more
completely understand the Icelandic facts. In this section, I will give a short overview of a
few possibilities for future research in this area.
5.4.1 Other Quirky Sentence Types
The analyses that I describe in this thesis only consider one type of quirky construction
in Icelandic. That is, the quirky subject construction with a nominative direct object. There
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are a variety of other quirky constructions in Icelandic that I would like to investigate in
the future.
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I explained how number agreement is optional in quirky
subject sentences, depending on if the subject or object becomes topicalized (see 7–10). As
I said then, I chose to ignore these constructions for the purposes of this thesis. However,
a complete analysis of the Icelandic facts should incorporate these different structures. One
avenue for future work is to expand my defective T analysis to accommodate these other
sentence patterns.
In addition to the topicalization facts from Chapter 1 that need to be accounted for,
Icelandic has other patterns of quirky case that need to be addressed. Icelandic has quirky
sentences with both a quirky subject and a quirky object, and sentences with a nominative
subject and quirky object. A complete analysis of Icelandic quirky case needs to consider
all of these quirky sentence types.
5.4.2 Defective T Explanation
The remaining nonstandard assumption of my defective T analysis is that T is [Person]-
defective in quirky subject sentences in the first place. I provided two tentative explanations
for this fact. First is that T’s [Person] deficiency ties into its relation with the quirky lexical
verb. Alternatively, T’s defectivity could result from a semantic selection restriction on the
quirky lexical verb. In order for the defective T analysis to be totally complete, a detailed
description of this phenomenon is necessary. For future work, I hope to analyze how these
mechanisms might function in these Icelandic quirky subject sentences.
5.4.3 ‘Future’ Work
While my defective T analysis is based in a strong Minimalist theory, the Minimalist
Program is constantly evolving and updating, as evidenced by the outdated Minimalist
analyses I described in Chapter 3. Two examples of this that relate directly to my work are
the use of the Activity Condition and the notion that ϕ-agreement conditions Case.
The Minimalist theoretical framework that I adopt for this thesis relies on the Activity
Condition as a requirement for feature checking (Chomsky 2001). While this has been fairly
standard, it is not universally adopted. As I briefly touched upon earlier, Sigurðsson and
Holmberg (2008) provide a split ϕ checking analysis similar to the one I describe in §4.3.
One of the main differences between their version and mine is that they reject the Activity
Condition, whereas I adopt it. In the future, I would like to investigate how dispatching the
Activity Condition from my theoretical framework would benefit or encumber my defective
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T analysis.
Another, much more recent development comes from Preminger (2014). The Minimalist
framework that I adopt traditionally accepts that ϕ-agreement conditions Case checking. It
is by agreeing with T for ϕ-features that a subject values its abstract Case feature, not the
other way around. Preminger provides a system whereby the opposite is true. In Preminger’s
analysis of Sakha, he argues that Case checking actually conditions ϕ agreement. In doing
so, Preminger rejects Bobaljik’s (2008) analysis that treats ϕ-agreement as a postsyntactic
operation. The account that Preminger sketches is very recent, and as far as I am aware
it still has not become the standard. However, adapting my defective T analysis into a
Premingerian system might be able to provide further support for defective T in Icelandic
quirky subject sentences.
5.5 Conclusion
In this thesis, I have analyzed Icelandic quirky subject sentences and their agreement
restrictions. Icelandic quirky subject constructions exhibit interesting phenomena beyond
just the case that surfaces. In quirky subject sentences, the finite verb agrees with the
nominative object rather than with the quirky subject. This goes counter to the pattern of
agreement in nominative-accusative sentences, which show agreement between the subject
and the verb. In addition, 1st and 2nd person nominative objects are totally blocked in
quirky subject sentences. Once again, this goes against the pattern of nominative-accusative
sentences, where all person specifications are allowed on subjects and objects. There is also
a number agreement asymmetry with object topics not present in nonquirky examples.
In order to attempt to explain two of these phenomena, I considered four modern
Minimalist analyses: (i) a ϕ-stacking analysis based on Richards’s (2013) case-stacking;
(ii) an analysis that treats T, the quirky subject, and the nominative object all as a complex
dependency (López 2008); (iii) a split ϕ probe analysis where [Person] probes separately
from [Number] and [Gender]; and (iv) a defective T analysis, where T in quirky subject
sentences lacks a [Person] feature.
While all of these analyses are moderately capable of deriving the Icelandic data patterns,
only my defective T analysis does so without relying on non-Minimalist or otherwise stipu-
lative assumptions. Future work in this area involves a more detailed explanation of why T
is ϕ-defective in quirky subject sentences, an extension to account for other Icelandic quirky
constructions, and an expansion of my analyses to accommodate more recent developments
in the Minimalist Program. Until then, the defective T analysis that I have described in this
thesis is the best way to explain the Icelandic quirky subject data.
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